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I. STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. NATURE OF CASE. 
This Appeal involves an Application for Permit to obtain a new water right filed by 
muitipie ground water districts ( collectively, the "Districts" or "GWDs"). 
This Court recently took under advisement the issue of whether the source of Rangen's 
water rights includes the so-called "talus slope" spring water that Rangen has used to raise fish for 
more than fifty years. Rangen, Inc. v. IDWR, Supr. Ct. Case No. 42772-2015. The GWDs' 
Application seeks to appropriate 12 cfs of the talus slope water. 
Even though they are applying for a new water right, the GWDs do not propose to actually 
do anything with the talus slope water. The water will flow down off the talus slope and pool in 
front of Rangen's Bridge Dam as it has for more than fifty years. The GWDs do not intend to put 
the water to beneficial use. Instead, they propose merely to assign the permit to Rangen to perfect 
the water right by having Rangen raise fish in its own facility using the water. The designated 
place of use (POU) and point of diversion (POD) are located wholly on Rangen's property. The 
Application provides no new water to Rangen, or any other senior water users on Billingsley Creek 
who continue to suffer shortages, while at the same time allowing continued depletions and injury 
to the Eastern Snake Plain Aquifer. 
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Director Spackman denied the Districts' Application, describing it as "the epitome of a 
mitigation shell game." (A.R., Vol. 2, p. 364)1• He concluded that the Application should be 
denied because it: (1) was filed in bad faith; and (2) was not in the local public interest. The GWDs 
filed an appeal of the Director's decision. The District Court reversed the Director's decision and 
remanded the Application back to the Director for further proceedings. Rangen contends that the 
Director's decision to deny the Application should be affirmed for the reasons discussed below. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. 
On April 3, 2013, seven different GWDs filed Application for Permit No. 36-16976 
("Application" or "Permit"). (A.R., Vol. 1, p. 1-4). The Application was amended several times. 
(A.R., Vol. I, p. 14-17; 83-86). 
On September 17, 2014, a Hearing Officer conducted a contested administrative hearing 
on the GWDs' Application. (A.R., Vol. 2, p. 263). Thereafter, on November 18, 2014, the Hearing 
Officer issued his Preliminmy Order Issuing Permit. On December 2, 2014, Rangen filed 
Exceptions to the Preliminary Order. (A.R., Vol. 2, p. 284). 
Director Spackman considered Rang en's Exceptions, and on February 6, 2015, the Director 
issued his Final Order Denying Application (Final Order). (A.R., Vol. 2, p. 349-365). On March 
5, 2015, the GWDs filed a Petition for Judicial Revie1-t· of the Final Order. 
On July 20, 2015, a hearing on the GWDs' Petition for Judicial Review was held before 
the Honorable Eric Wildman. On August 7, 2015, the District Court issued a Jvfemorandum 
1 The Clerk's Record on Appeal (R.) includes a disc of the agency record, exhibits, and hearing transcripts for the 
Judicial Review of the Districts' Permit Application, labeled AR_2015-83 (AR.). These records shall be referred to 
in the citations herein by "R." and "AR." accordingly. 
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Decision and Order reversing the Director's Final Order. On September 17, 2015, Rangen filed 
a Notice ofAppeal seeking this Court's review. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
On December 11, 2011, Rangen filed a Petition.for Delivery Call. (A.R., Exh. 1008). The 
Petition involved two of Rangen's water rights: 36-02551 and 36-07694. These rights authorized 
the diversion of 74.54 cubic feet per second ( cfs) of water. (Id). During the hearing on the delivery 
call, the Director noted that Rangen had reported flows which averaged 50.7 cfs in 1966. The 
flows declined 33 cfs between 1966 to 2012. (Id, p. 33). In 2012, flows for the Rangen's rights 
averaged just 14.6 cfs. (Id). 
On January 29, 2014, after several years of litigation, the Director concluded that junior-
priority groundwater pumping in the Eastern Snake Plain Aquifer ("ESP A") is causing material 
injury to Rangen's senior water rights. (Id, p. 36). The Director ordered the junior-priority users 
to provide Rangen with 9.1 cfs of water, but allowed them to phase-in the delivery over a period 
of five years. (Id., p. 42). 
On April 3, 2013, seven different GWDs filed an Application for Permit No. 36-16976. 
(A.R., Vol. 1, p. 1-4). The Application was amended several times. (A.R., Vol. 1, p. 14-17; 83-
86). The Application stated two purposes of use: fish propagation and mitigation. (Id.). The 
purposes of use were intended to cover any mitigation obligation owed to Rangen. The stated 
intent of the GWDs when they applied for the permit was to obtain the permit and assign the permit 
to Rangen for the company to perfect the water right. (A.R., Tr. p. 75, I. 19-25; p. 76, 1. 1-7). 
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The GWDs' Application designated a place of use (POU) and point of diversion (POD) 
entirely located on Rangen's real property. The GWDs stipulated that "Rangen owns the property, 
place of use, and point of diversion." (A.R., Tr. 246, I. 13-14 ). The GWDs did not have the 
consent or authority to perfect the water they sought to appropriate using Rangen's property. (A.R., 
Exh. 113-14). (A.R., Tr. p. 246, I. 21-25). 
The GWDs proposed to use Rangen's existing diversion works, the same diversion works 
the company had been using for fifty years, to perfect the GWDs' permit. (A.R., Tr. 85, 1. i-21 ). 
The GWDs have taken no steps or taken any "action" to gain possessory use of Rangen' s property. 
The GWDs did file a Notice of Eminent Domain ("Notice"), but the Notice only refers to access 
and rights of way. The Notice does not indicate that the GWDs seek to obtain any fee title or 
occupancy use of Rangen's property, uses which are necessary to perfect any water right allowed 
under the Application. (A.R., Exh. 1014). Even if the Notice had stated an intent to obtain title 
to Rangen's Bridge Dam or other portions of Rangen's facility, the GWDs do not have the 
authority to accomplish such a taking. 
The GWDs' Application was executed by "Thomas J. Budge, Attorney." At the time the 
Application was filed, there was no Power of Attorney or corporate resolution giving Mr. Budge 
the authority to execute the Application on behalf of the GWDs. (See, A.R., Exh. 1000, 1004). 
The Application was also incomplete in that no addresses for the Applicant GWDs were listed as 
required. (Id.). 
Ultimately, the Director denied the GWDs' Application, finding that it was filed in bad 
faith and was not in the local public interest. The Director explained the injury Rangen and 
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Billingsley Creek would suffer if the Application were granted to satisfy the junior-priority users' 
mitigation obligations: 
... the Districts' Application attempts to establish a means to satisfy the required 
mitigation obligation by delivering water to Rangen that Rangen has been using for 
fifty years. The Districts' Application is the epitome of a mitigation shell game. 
The Districts' Application brings no new water to the already diminished flows of 
Curren Tunnel or headwaters of Billingsley Creek. It is not in the local public 
interest to approve such an Application. 
(A.R., Vol. 2, p. 364) (Emphasis added). Thereafter, the Director denied the GWDs' Permit. (Id). 
Two of the Districts appealed the Director's determination. The District Court reversed the 
Director's determination and remanded the application back to the Director for further 
proceedings. Rangen timely filed an Appeal to this Court. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the Director's ruling that the Districts' Application was filed in bad faith 
is supported by substantial competent evidence. 
2. Whether the Director's denial should be affirmed because the Districts' Application 
is speculative. 
3. Whether the Director acted within the boundaries of his authority v1hen he ruled 
that the Districts' Application was not in the "local public interest." 
4. Whether the Director's denial should be affirmed because the application does not 
propose any defined beneficial use. 
5. Whether the Director's denial should be affirmed because the Districts' Application 
is incomplete. 
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6. Whether the substantial rights of Rangen have been prejudiced by the granting of 
the GWDs' Application. 
III. ST AND ARD OF REVIEW 
In an appeal from a decision of the District Court acting in its appellate capacity under the 
IDAPA, this Court reviews the record created before the agency independently of the District 
Court's decision. See, Chisholm v. Idaho Dept. o,f Water Resources, 142 Idaho 159, 125 P.3d 515 
(2005). In addition, "[T]he Court docs not substitute its judgment as to the weight of evidence 
presented, Idaho Code§ 67-5279(1), but instead defers to the agency's findings of fact unless they 
are clearly erroneous. When conflicting evidence is presented the agency's findings must be 
sustained on appeal, as long as they are supported by substantial and competent evidence, 
regardless of whether [the court] might have reached a different conclusion." Id., ( citations 
omitted). "A strong presumption of validity favors an agency's actions." Young Elec. Sign Co. v. 
State ex rel. Winder, 135 Idaho 804, 807, 25 P.3d 117, 120 (2001). 
Idaho Code§ 67-5279 governs judicial review of agency decisions. The reviewing court 
shall affirm the agency decision: 
[U)nless it finds that the agency's findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions 
are: "(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) in excess of the 
statutory authority of the agency; (c) made upon unlawful procedure; (d) not 
supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or (e) arbitrary, 
capricious, or an abuse of discretion." 
In the Distribution of Water to Various Water Rights, 155 Idaho 640, 647, 315 P.3d 828, 835 
(2013) (quoting Clear Springs Foods, Inc. v. Spackman, 150 Idaho 790, 796, 252 P.3d 71, 77 
(2011 )). "An action is capricious if it was done without a rational basis. It is arbitrary if it was 
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done in disregard of the facts and circumstances presented or without adequate determining 
principles." American Lung Ass 'n of Idaho/Nevada v. State, Department o.f Agriculture, 142 Idaho 
544, 130 P.3d 1062 (2006), citing Enterprise, Inc. v. Nampa City, 96 Idaho 734, 536 P.2d 729 
( 197 5). The party challenging the agency action must first show that the agency erred in a manner 
specified in I.C. 67-5279(3) and then establish that a substantial right has been violated. Barron 
v. Id. Dept. o.f Water Resources, 135 Idaho 414,417, 18 P.3d 219,222 (2001). The "agency shall 
be affirn1ed unless substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced.'' LC. § 67-5279( 4). 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. THE DIRECTOR'S RULING THAT THE DISTRICTS' APPLICATION 
WAS FILED IN BAD FAITH IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT 
EVIDENCE. 
The statutory criteria for granting an Application to appropriate water is set forth in LC. § 
42-203A(5). One of the criteria is that an Application may be denied "where it appears to the 
satisfaction of the director that such Application is not made in good faith, is made for delay or 
speculative purposes." LC.§ 42-203A(5)(c). This provision does not define "bad faith" or "good 
faith." Rule 45 of the Idaho Department of Water Resources' Appropriation Rules provides some 
guidance. It provides in relevant part: 
An Application will be found to have been made in good faith if: 
i. The applicant shall have legal access to the property necessary to construct and 
operate the proposed project, has the authority to exercise eminent domain authority 
to obtain such access . . . ; and 
ii. The applicant is in the process of obtaining other permits needed to construct and 
operate the project; and 
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iii. There are no obvious impediments that prevent the successful completion of 
the project 
IDAPA 37.03.08.045.01.c. 
1. There is substantial competent evidence to support the Director's finding 
that there are threshold impediments to completion of a project. 
The Director concluded that the GWDs' Application was filed in bad faith pursuant to 
IDAPA 37.03.08.0445.01.c.(iii). The District Court improperly reversed this detennination. 
There is substantial competent evidence to support the Director's determination and it should be 
affirmed. 
In rev1ewmg the Preliminary Order entered by the Hearing Officer, the Director 
recognized the inherent problem with the GWDs' Application. The G\VDs do not propose to do 
anything with the water they seek to appropriate. The GWDs do not intend to build diversion 
works or divert the water.2 Rangen will simply continue to divert the water at its Bridge Dam as 
it has for over fifty years. The GWDs do not intend to convey the water anywhere. The water will 
continue to flow through Rangen's facility as it has for over fifty years. The GWDs do not propose 
to beneficially use the water. Rangen will continue to use the water to raise fish in its Research 
Hatchery as it has done for over fifty years. While Rangen has sought a detennination from this 
Court that its water rights encompass the talus slope water,3 Rangen has recently been granted a 
2 After the Application was filed, the GWDs added a proposal to pump a portion of the water from Billingsley Creek 
to Rangen's Hatch House and research facilities. Rangen does not want the water moved from where it pools in 
front of the Bridge Dam. (A.R., Tr. p. 248, I. 7-15). The GWDs have indicated that they would only move water to 
the extent Rangen wanted water moved. (A.R., Tr. p. 89, I. 1-19). The simple fact is the pump was added to the 
Application solely because the GWDs aren't proposing to do anything but observe Rangen using the water. The 
GWDs didn't actually intend to pump any water. 
3 Rangen, Inc. v. IDWR, Supr. Ct. Case No. 42772-2015. 
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separate water right authorizing the use of water from the talus slope at the Bridge Dam. The 
GWDs intend to simply watch Rangen continue to use water that would be legally available to 
Rangen with or without the GWDs' Application and be given mitigation credit for it. The GWDs 
want the new right for "mitigation" for the damage they are doing, but the GWDs do not propose 
to bring in any new water to augment the flows of Billingsley Creek. 
The Director ruled that the GWDs' Application was made in "bad faith" because there is a 
threshold impediment to "completion of the project.'' (A.R., Vol. 2, p. 362). Based on the evidence 
presented at the hearing, the Director concluded that when the Districts filed their Application they 
had no intent to do anything with the water other than to assign the Permit to Rangen so that it 
could perfect the water right using its facility. (See id.). The Director reasoned that: "[t]o perfect 
a project for a water right, there inherently must be completion of works for beneficial use." (See 
id.). The Director's decision is supported by substantial competent evidence and should be 
affirmed. 
The Director's actual finding was as follows: 
26. The District's Application was filed in bad faith because, for a majority of the 
quantity of water sought to be appropriated, there is a threshold impediment to 
"completion of the project." To perfect a project for a water right, there inherently 
must be completion of works for beneficial use. The testimony of Lynn Carlquist 
quoted above demonstrates the Districts' intent at the time of filing the Districts' 
Application was to simply obtain the Permit and assign it to Rangen to perfect by 
utilizing the water in the Rangen facility the way Rangen has done for the last fifty 
years. The initial filing by the Districts did not contemplate any construction of 
works and completion of any project. Furthermore, even at this point, with respect 
to at least 8.0 cfs of the 12 cfs the Districts propose for appropriation, Rangen will 
continue to divert through its existing Bridge Diversion. There is no "project" and 
consequently cannot be a "completion of the project" for the 8.0 cfs, because the 
8.0 cfs will be diverted through the existing Bridge Diversion without any 
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construction of a project or any completion of works for beneficial use. The 
Districts' Application fails the bad faith test based on the threshold question of 
whether there will be a project, and whether there will be any construction of works 
for perfection of beneficial use. 
(A.R, Vol. 2, p. 362). 
The GWDs' only proposed contribution is the filing of the Application itself. Lynn 
Carlquist, a director of the North Snake GWD, candidly admitted that once the Application was 
filed the GWDs intended to simply assign it to Rangen to perfect. Testifying on behalf of the 
GWDs, Carlquist stated that the GWDs did not propose any "project" of their own to perfect the 
Application. Rather, it was the intent of the GWDs at filing to simply take and use Rangen's 
existing facilities to force Rangen to perfect a water right on behalf the GWDs. The GWDs' 
proposal at filing was simply to assign the permit to Rangen for it to perfect the Application on the 
GWDs' behalf: 
Q. And when I asked you last time [at your deposition], you told me that it was 
your intent it obtain the permit and then assign the pennit to Rangen for us to 
perfect; correct? 
A. Well, that would be the easiest way for us to perfect it, if they would agree 
to that. 
Q. Okay. So you would be taking advantage of Rangen's existing fish facility 
that it built, correct, to do that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You would be taking advantage of the diversion apparatus that Rangen has 
built and has had in place for 50 years to do that; correct? 
A. That's correct. 
(A.R., Tr. p. 75, I. 23-25; p. 76, 1. 1-11). 
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The GWDs argued to the District Court that there is nothing in the rules which requires 
actual "construction. (R., p. 60). The District Court determined that the Director's conclusion of 
bad faith was not supported by substantial evidence by inferring that the Director was imposing a 
requirement of new construction. (R., p. 193 ). 
The District Courts' conclusion constitutes too narrow of an interpretation of the Director's 
Final Order and fails to recognize the broader problem with the GWDs' Application. In order to 
issue a new water right permit, there must be a proposed project to divert and beneficially use 
water that can actually be completed. While it is true, as Judge Wildman noted, that the proposed 
project can utilize existing physical structures, there still must be some identifiable project by 
which the applicant intends to beneficially use the water. As the Director recognized, the 
Application the GWDs filed did not propose any such project. Essentially, the GWDs proposed 
to watch Rangen continue to divert and beneficially use the water in the same way it has for more 
than fifty years. In this context, the conclusion that the GWDs did not have a "project" or that the 
Application did not contemplate a "completion of the project" is amply supported by the record 
and is entitled to deference. 
The Appropriation Rules contemplate that an Applicant have a "project" of some kind to 
complete in order to perfect a water right. See, IDAPA 37.03.08.45.c. The GWDs' Application 
does not involve an instream water use. Accordingly, a "project" is necessary to divert water. The 
term "project" is used throughout the Appropriation Rules. The definition of "project works" 
contemplates the creation of construction of some apparatus to divert water. 
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14. Project Works. A general tenn which includes diversion works, 
conveyance works, and any devices which may be used to apply the water to the 
intended use. Improvements which have been made as a result of application of 
water, such as land preparation for cultivation, are not a part of the project works. 
IDAPA 37.03.08.010.14. In this case, when the GWDs filed their application, there was no such 
"project" contemplated. 
The Director is intimately familiar with the unique situation that led to the filing of the 
GWDs' Application. The GWDs' Application was filed in an attempt to take advantage of a 
dispute that arose during Rangen's 2011 delivery call regarding whether the source of Rangen's 
existing water rights included the talus slope and head of Billingsley Creek that is at issue with the 
GWDs' Application in the present action. On April 3, 2013, the Director heard oral argument on 
a motion for summary judgment regarding this issue. 
15. Following oral argument on this issue, the Director expressed concern that the 
specific reference to Curren Tunnel as the source for Rangen's water rights might 
prevent a delivery call for any water diverted by Rangen from both springs located 
below Curren Tunnel and from Billingsley Creek. Whether Rangen's water rights 
authorize the diversion of water from Billingsley Creek became an issue of both 
fact and law in the Rangen Delivery Call. See Source Order at 6-7. 
16. The Districts filed the Districts' Application with the Department on April 3, 
2013, the day of oral argument for the Source Motion before the Director. 
(A.R., Vol. 2,p. 351). 
20. In the Curtailment Order, the Director stated: 
15. The source for water right nos. 36-0255 I and 36-07694 is the Curren Tunnel. 
The point of diversion for both water rights is described to the l O acre tract: 
SESWNW Sec. 32, T7S, Rl4E. While Rangen has historically diverted water from 
Billingsley Creek at the Bridge Diversion located in the SWSWNW Sec. 32, T7s, 
$14E, Rangen's SRBA decrees do not identify Billingsley Creek as a source of 
water and do not include a point of diversion in the SWSWNW Sec. 32, T7S, Rl4E. 
A decree entered in a general adjudication such as the SRBA is conclusive as to the 
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nature and extent of the water right. Idaho Code § 42-1420. Administration must 
comport with the unambiguous terms of the SRBA decrees. Because the SRBA 
decrees identify the source of the water as the Curren Tunnel, Rangen is limited to 
only that water discharging from the Curren Tunnel. Because the SRBA decrees 
list the point of diversion as SES WNW Sec. 32, T7S, RI4E, Rangen is restricted to 
diverting water that emits from the Curren Tunnel in that 10-acre tract. Ex. l 008 
at 32. 
21. On February 3, 2014, Rangen filed application to appropriate water nos. 36-
17002. Application no. 36-17002 seeks a water right for 59 cfs. Application no. 
36-17002 identifies the same point of di version as the Districts' Application. 
2, 2015, for 28.1 cfs for fish propagation, with a priority date of February 3, 2014. (A. R., Vol. 2, 
p. 353, FN4). Regardless of the outcome of Rangen's appeal concerning the source of its water 
rights, Rangen has a water right to use all of the water that the GWDs seek to appropriate with this 
Application. This means that no one will use any of the water that the GWDs seek to appropriate. 
Rangen will continue to use all of the water available at the Bridge Dam pursuant to its own water 
rights, including the new right that was recently issued. 
With this context, the Director examined the GWDs' intent and motivation for filing this 
Application when discussing the local public interest: 
34. Approval of the Districts' Application would establish an unacceptable 
precedent in other delivery call proceedings that are or may be pending. In the 
Rangen Delivery Call, the Director determined that certain ground water users were 
causing material injury to Rangen by reducing flows from the Curren Tunnel and 
that junior-priority water rights would be curtailed if mitigation was not provided 
to Rangen. The Districts' [sic] originally proposed assigning the Permit to Rangen 
as part of IGWA's first mitigation plan. See Amended Final Order Approving in 
Part and Rejecting in Part IGWA 's Mitigation Plan; Order L[fting Stay Issued 
February 21, 2014; Amended Curtailment Order. The Director noted at that time 
"IGWA's water right application could be characterized as a preemptive strike 
against Rangen to establish a prospective priority date earlier than any later 
prospective priority date borne by a Rangen application." Id. While a race to file 
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an application to appropriate water does not itself establish that the Districts' 
Application is not in the local public interest, the Districts' Application attempts to 
establish a means to satisfy the required mitigation obligation by delivering water 
to Rangen that Rangen has been using for fifty years. The Districts' Application is 
the epitome of a mitigation shell game. The Districts' Application brings no new 
water to the already diminished flows of the Curren Tunnel or headwaters of 
Billingsley Creek. It is not in the local public interest to approve such an 
application. 
(A. R., Vol. 2, p.364.) 
Based on the evidence in the record and the unique situation presented by this Application, 
the Director's legal and factual conclusions that the Application was filed in bad faith are supported 
by substantial and competent evidence in the record. Therefore, the Director's conclusions are 
binding on the Court. Wilkinson v. State, 151 Idaho 784, 264 P.3d 680 (Ct.App. 201 I). 
Furthermore, the Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the agency on questions of fact 
involving the weight of particular evidence. Woodfield v. Board of Professional Discipline, I 27 
Idaho 738, 905 P.2d 1047 (Ct.App 1995). As such, the Director's decision to deny the Application 
should be affirmed. 
2. The District Court improperly made determinations on issues upon which 
the Director did not make any findings. 
It is important to note that the Director did not make any finding of facts on either 
subsection (i) or subsection (ii) of Rule 45 of the Appropriation Rules (IDAPA 37.03.08.045.01.c). 
These provisions require an examination of whether the GWDs have the eminent domain authority 
necessary to gain possession of Rangen' s property. When the District Court reviewed this matter, 
it found that: 
With respect to the criteria set forth in IDAPA 37.03.08.045.01.c.(i), (ii) and (iii), 
the record establishes that the Districts have "the authority to exercise eminent 
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domain authority to obtain such access" necessary to construct and operate the 
proposed project. The applicants are ground water districts formed under Chapter 
52, Title 42, Idaho Code. R., p. 355; Tr., pp. 15-18. Idaho Code grants them "the 
power of eminent domain in the manner provided by law for the condemnation of 
private property for easements, rights-of-way, and other rights of access to property 
necessary to the exercise of the mitigation power herein granted .... " The record 
does not establish that any other permits are necessary to construct and operate the 
project proposed by the application, and the Director's Final Order does not find 
that the Districts have failed to pursue any necessary permits .... ". 
(R., p.195). 
It was improper for the District Court to make findings regarding issues that were not 
decided by the Director. To the extent that the Director did not make any findings under 
Subsections c.i and ii, the trial court substituted its own findings for that of the agency. In this 
regard, the trial court erred. If there are no findings or findings are not adequate, the trial court 
must remand for the agency to make findings. 
Under Idaho's Administrative Procedures Act, I.C. § 67-5201 et seq., ... when an 
appeal is brought to a district court and the findings of fact to be reviewed are 
missing or inadequate the district court should remand the case to the [agency]. See 
Workman Family Partnership v. City of I'Yvin Falls, 104 Idaho 32, 655 P.2d 926 
( 1982), (stating that failure to hold otherwise would be to authorize the district court 
to substitute its judgment for that of the agency despite the express provision 
prohibiting such action in subsection (g) ofI.C. § 67-5215). 
Idaho County Nursing Home v. Idaho Department °'/Health and We(fare, 124 Idaho 116, 117-18, 
856 P.2d 1283 (1993). 
In the event this Court were to reverse the Director's finding of bad faith under IDAPA 
37.03.08.045.01.c.(iii), the Court should remand this matter to the Director for further 
consideration of subsections ii and iii of IDAPA 37.03.08.045.01.c. To the extent the Court 
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determines it is necessary to actually examine the issues, the Court should consider the arguments 
addressed below. 
a) The GWDs do not have legal access to Rangen's property and 
do not have the authority to exercise eminent domain authority to 
obtain such access (IDAPA 37.03.08.045.01.c.i). 
Under subsection (i) of Rule 45 of the Appropriation Rules, "[t]he applicant shall have the 
legal access to the property necessary to construct and operate the proposed project, [ and] has the 
authority to exercise eminent domain authority to obtain such access." (IDAPA 
37.03.08.045.01.c.i). The Director did not address this requirement because he found bad faith 
under subsection (iii) of Rule 45. When the District Court reviewed the GWDs' Application, it 
actually made two inconsistent rulings. First, the District Court held that the GWDs had the 
statutory "power of eminent domain in the manner provided by law for the condemnation of private 
property for easements, rights-of-way, and other rights of access to property necessary to the 
exercise of mitigation power herein granted." (R., p. 199) (citing LC.§ 42-5224(13)). Based on 
this authority, the District Court held that the GWDs had satisfied the necessary elements of 
subsection ii or Rule 45 of the Appropriation Rules, finding that it was possible for the GWDs to 
obtain legal access to Rangen's property. 
Rangen argued before the District Court that the GWDs did not, as a matter of law, have 
the actual legal authority to condemn and take Rangen's property to complete the Application. The 
ability to condemn property is outlined under Idaho's condemnation statutes. Those statutes 
specify the three distinct property interests that may be obtained by eminent domain. These three 
interests are as follows: 
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7-702. ESTATES SUBJECT TO TAKING. The following is a classification of the 
estates and rights in lands subject to be taken for public use: 
I. A fee simple, when taken for public buildings or grounds, or for 
permanent buildings, for reservoirs and darns and permanent flooding occasioned 
thereby, or for an outlet for a flow, or a place for the deposit of debris or tailings of 
amme. 
2. An easement, when taken for any other use. 
3. The right of entry upon, and occupation of, lands, and the right to take 
therefrom such earth, gravel, stones, trees and timber as may be necessary for some 
public use. 
LC. § 7-702. 
The GWDs' condemnation authority is not so broadly defined to include the three 
"bundles" of property rights, which are subject to eminent domain proceedings under Section 7-
702. Rather, the GWDs can only: 
... exercise the power of eminent domain in the manner provided by law for the 
condemnation of private property for easements, rights of way, and other rights of 
access of to property necessary to the exercise of the mitigation powers herein 
granted, both within and without the district. 
I.C. § 42-5224(13). (Emphasis added). Section 42-5224(13) expressly and unequivocally limits 
the GWDs' eminent domain powers to situations where they are obtaining "easements, rights of 
way or other rights of access." It does not grant the Districts the power to condemn and take fee 
title possession of property (i.e., take Rangen's Bridge Darn or to occupy its property to construct 
a pump station). The GWDs' limited condemnation authority was recognized in this very case. 
The Hearing Officer held that GWDs did not have the ability to gain any fee title interest to 
Rangen's property, or to otherwise occupy its property. (A.R., Vol. 2, p. 269). This finding was 
not appealed by the GWDs. (A.R., Vol. 2, p. 313-319). 
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On the issue of whether the GWDs had the actual eminent domain authority to take 
Rangen's property to perfect their water right, the trial court declined to make any finding. Rather, 
the trial court held: 
Rangen also raises several arguments regarding the ability of the Districts to 
exercise their eminent domain powers to perfect their application for permit. Since 
issues of that nature are more appropriately addressed in the context of a challenge 
to a condemnation proceeding, the Court, so as to not prejudiee the issues, will not 
address these arguments. 
(R., p. 203). 
On one hand, the trial court made a finding that the GWDs had possible legal access to 
Rangen's property, citing the GWDs' authority under Section 42-5224(13). On the other hand, 
the District court expressly declined to rule whether the GWDs had the actual type of eminent 
domain authority to perfect their Application for permit. 
On the issue of actual legal access, the GWDs did not submit as evidence any agreements 
to divert water on Rangen's property, nor did they show any court order granting them authority 
to enter Rangen's property. The only evidence produced by the GWDs was a Notice of Intent to 
Exercise the Power of Eminent Domain. (A.R., Exh. 1014). There is nothing in that Notice 
indicating that the GWDs intended to condemn property to build a pump station or to condemn 
Rangen's pre-existing Bridge Dam at the head of Billingsley Creek to divert water that Rangen has 
been using since 1962. 
To summarize, given the trial court's two inconsistent rulings, and the fact that the GWDs 
failed to show they had any legal access, there has been no showing that "[t]he applicant shall 
have legal access to the propertv necessary to construct and operate the proposed project, has the 
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authority to exercise eminent domain authority to obtain such access" as required under IDAPA 
37.03.08.045.c(i). (Emphasis added). Accordingly, the District Court's finding that the GWDs' 
have the power of eminent domain under Subsection c.i of Rule 45 is erroneous. 
b) The Director did not make any findings regarding what 
permits might be necessary to complete the project (IDAPA 
37 .03.08.045.c(ii)). 
The Director also did not make any finding of facts regarding subsection (ii) of Rule 45 of 
the Appropriation Rules (IDAPA 37.03.08.045.01.c). When the District Court reviewed the issue, 
it found: 
The record does not establish that any other permits are necessary to construct and 
operate the project proposed by the application, and the Director's Final Order does 
not find that the Districts have failed to pursue any necessary permits. 
(R., p. 195). The District Court's finding was erroneous. 
The Director did not address this issue because he found bad faith pursuant to subsection 
(iii) of Rule 45. The Director's ruling did not contain any findings on whether there were any 
permits were required for the project. The only "finding" made by the Director was the following 
statement oflaw: 
6. The Applicant must also demonstrate that is "in the process of obtaining other 
permits needed to construct and operate the project" and that there are no obvious 
impediments that prevent successful completion of the project." IDAP A 
37.03.08.45.01.ci-iii. 
(A.R., Vol. 2, p. 358). Other than this statement of law, the Director made no findings. 
Accordingly, in the event this Court were to reverse the Director's decision to deny the 
Application, this case should be remanded to the Director to detennine what permits, if any, are 
required and whether such permits have been obtained. 
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B. THE DIRECTOR'S DENIAL SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE THE 
DISTRICTS' APPLICATION IS SPECULATIVE. 
As previously indicated, one of the statutory criteria for granting an application to 
appropriate is that the application is not "speculative." LC. § 42-203A(5). The Director did not 
rule on Rangen's speculation arguments "because the Director concluded that the Districts' 
Application was filed in bad faith." (A.R., Vol. 2, p. 362). Nonetheless, the District Court ruled 
that the application was not speculative. The District Court's ruling was erroneous since the 
Director did not rule on the issue. The District Court should have remanded the matter back to the 
Director for further findings on this issue. Idaho County Nursing Home v. Idaho Department of 
Health and Welfare, supra. 
Under IDAPA 37.03.08.045.0 l .b, "[ s]peculation for the purpose of this rule is an intention 
to obtain a pennit to appropriate water without the intention of applying the water to beneficial use 
... " (Emphasis added). The well-established general rule throughout western prior appropriation 
states regarding speculative applications for permits is that an appropriator must be the actual 
appropriator or it must have some agency relationship with the party who is actually appropriating 
the water. Colorado River Water Conservation District v. Vidler Tunnel Water Company, 594 
P.2d 566 (Colo. 1979); see e.g., Bacher v. State Engineer of Nevada, 146 P.3d 793, 799 (Nev. 
2006). The doctrine "addresses the situation in which the purported appropriator does not intend 
to put water to use for its own benefit and has no contractual or agency relationship with one who 
does." Id. at 799, citing Three Bells Ranch v. Cache La Poudre, 758 P.2d 164, 173 n.11 (Colo. 
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I 988). Here, the GWDs are not the appropriators, and they have no agency relationship with 
Rangen to perfect the water right on their behalf. 
The GWDs' Application designates a POU and POD that are wholly located on Rangen's 
property. Because the GWDs do not own the POU or POD designated in their Application, their 
Application is void on its face. The long-standing rule in Idaho and most every other jurisdiction 
with respect to perfecting a water right on property not owned by the water user is as follows: 
It is quite generally heid that a water right initiated by trespass is void. That is to 
say, one who diverts water and puts it to a beneficial use by aid of a trespass does 
not, pursuant to such trespass, acquire a water right. Any claim of right thus initiated 
is void. 
Lemmon v. Hardy, 95 Idaho 778, 780, 519 P.2d 1168 (1974), citing Bassett v. Svvenson, 51 Idaho 
256, 5 P .2d 722 (1931 ). See also, Joyce Livestock v. US.A., 144 Idaho 1, 18, 156 P .3d 502, (2007); 
Branson v. Miracle, 107 Idaho 221, 227, 687 P.2d 1348 (1984). 
Under this rule, the Court in Lemmon held that the "[l]ack of a possessory interest in the 
property designated as the place of use is speculation. Persons may not file an application for a 
water right and then seek a place for use thereof." Id. at 781. (Emphasis added). To the extent an 
application is filed without a possessory right in the place of use, the application is void. 
Furthermore, as previously argued in Section IV.A.2(a), infra, the GWDs have no way of obtaining 
the type of possessory interest to take Rangen's Bridge Dam or to place a pump station on 
Rangen's property, under their limited eminent domain authority under I.C. § 42-5224(13). 
For all these reasons, the District Court's detennination that the GWDs' Application was 
not speculative is erroneous. At the very least, because the District Court did not rule on the 
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speculation issue, the District Court should have remanded the case back to the Director for further 
findings. Idaho County Nursing Home v. Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, supra. 
C. THE DIRECTOR ACTED WITHIN HIS AUTHORITY WHEN DENYING 
THE DISTRICTS' APPLICATION ON THE BASIS THAT IT \VAS NOT IN THE 
LOCAL PUBLIC INTEREST. 
The Director held that the GWDs' Application was not in the local public interest. The 
"local public interest" is defined as "the interest that the people in the area directly affected by a 
proposed water use have in the effects of such use on the public water resource." LC. § 42-202B. 
The Director's interpretation of the "local public interest" under this Application should have been 
given "great weight." As stated in another case where the Department was interpreting whether 
partial forfeiture was allowed under LC. § 42-222, this Court held: 
This four prong test states that an agency's construction of a statute will be given 
great weight if: ( 1) the agency has been entrusted with the responsibility to 
administer the statute at issue; (2) the agency's construction of the statute is 
reasonable; (3) the statutory language at issue does not expressly treat the precise 
question at issue; and ( 4) any of the rationales underlying the rule of deference are 
present. . . There is no question that IDWR is entrusted with the responsibility to 
administer water resources in the state. LC.§§ 42-1701--1778; §§ 42-1801--1806. 
State v. Hagerman Water Right Owners, Inc., 130 Idaho 727, 947 P.2d 400, (1997). Here, the 
District Court did not give the Director's analysis of the "local public interest" any weight, let alone 
"great weight," as required by Idaho law. "The determination of what elements of the public interest 
are impacted, and what the public interest requires, is committed to Water Resources' sound 
discretion." Matter of Permit No. 47-7680, 114 Idaho 600, 759 P.2d 891 (1988), citing 1 R. Clark, 
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS§ 29.3, 170 (1967). 
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As the District Court stated, LC. § 42-202B was amended in 2003. However, that 
amendment was not intended to limit the discretion of the Director to reject a water right that the 
Director has determined to be "the epitome of a mitigation shell game" and which "brings no new 
water to the already diminished flows of Current Tunnel or headwaters of Billingsley Creek." The 
Statement of Purpose for the Amendment indicates: 
This legislation clarifies the scope of the "local public interest" review in 
water right applications, transfers and water supply bank transactions. This 
legislation is intended to ensure that the Department of Water Resources has 
adequate authority to require that diversions, transfers and other actions affecting 
water resources do not frustrate the public's interest in the effective utilization of 
its water resources. The "local public interest" should be construed to ensure the 
greatest possible benefit from the public waters is achieved; however, it should not 
be construed to require the Department to consider secondary effects of an activity 
simply because that activity happens to use water. For example, the effect of a new 
manufacturing plant on water quality, resident fish and wildlife and the availability 
of water for other beneficial uses is appropriately considered under the local public 
interest criteria. On the other hand, the effect of the manufacturing plant on the air 
quality is not within the local public interest criteria because it is not an effect of 
the diversion of water but rather a secondary effect of the proposed plant. While 
the impact of the manufacturing plant on air quality is important, this effect should 
be evaluated by DEQ under the E PH A. As noted by the Idaho Supreme Court in 
Shokal v. Dunn, 109 Idaho 330 85), "[i]t is not the primary job of Water Resources 
to protect the health and welfare of Idaho's citizens and visitors that role is vested" 
in other agencies. 
Water Resources [sic] role under the "local public interest" is to ensure that 
proposed water uses are consistent with securing "the f,Yfeatest possible benefit from 
[the public waters] for the public." Thus, within the confines of this legislation, 
Water Resources should consider all locally important factors affecting the public 
water resources, including but not limited to fish and wildlife habitat, aquatic life, 
recreation, aesthetic beauty, transportation, navigation, water quality and the effect 
of such use on the availability of water for alternative uses of water that might be 
made within a reasonable time. This legislation contemplates that "[t]he 
relevant impacts and their relative weights will vary with local needs, 
circumstances, and interests." "The determination of what elements of the 
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public interest are impacted, and what the public interest requires, is 
committee [sic] to Water Resources' sound discretion." 
House Bill No. 284 - Statement of Purpose RS 13046. (Emphasis added). 
This Statement of Purpose makes it clear that the term "local public interest" was not 
narrowed in the way that the District Court interpreted it. 
In this case, the Director's rationale that this Application does not satisfy any mitigation 
requirements requires almost no additional comment. The Director concluded that allowing the 
GWDs to use the talus slope water for mitigation, the same water Rangen had been using for fifty 
years, would not be in the local public interest. 
34. Approval of the Districts' Application would establish an unacceptable 
precedent in other delivery call proceedings that are or may be pending . .. The 
Director noted at that time "IGW A's water right application could be characterized 
as a preemptive strike against Rangen to establish a prospective priority date earlier 
than any later prospective priority date borne by a Rangen application." Id. While 
a race to file an application to appropriate water does not itself establish that the 
Districts' Application is not in the local public interest, the Districts' Application 
attempts to establish a means to satisfy the required mitigation obligation by 
delivering water to Rangen that Rangen has been using for fifty years. The 
Districts' Application is the epitome of a mitigation shell game. The Districts' 
Application brings no new water to the already diminished flows of Curren 
Tunnel or headwaters of Billingsley Creek. It is not in the local public interest 
to approve such an application. 
(A.R., Vol. 2, p. 364). (Emphasis added). 
The local "public water resource" is Billingsley Creek, and all the springs that feed 
Billingsley Creek. As evidenced by Rangen's successful water call, the record is not in dispute 
that junior-priority groundwater pumping by the GWDs' members has negatively impacted the 
Billingsley Creek drainage. (A.R., Vol. 2, p. 352). With this Application, the GWDs are applying 
for water flowing within Billingsley Creek, the very same source of water which is being depleted 
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by their groundwater pumping. The Director concluded that it was not in the local public interest 
for the GWDs to satisfy their mitigation obligation by providing no new water, and providing only 
that water which Rangen had been previously using for the past fifty years. The Director 
concluded that the so-called mitigation does not, in fact, provide any "new water" to the depleted 
resource and allows the GWDs to continue to deplete the aquifer, without actually mitigating for 
the injury caused by their members' water use. 
The Director's decision that the GWDs' legal tactic is not in the "local public interest" 
should have been given "great weight." State v. Hagerman Water Right Oivners, Inc., supra. The 
Director should have substantial discretion in deciding whether proposed "mitigation" water is, in 
fact, mitigation water. He should have discretion is deciding how senior users on any given public 
waterways, who are suffering injury, are mitigated. Allowing "shell games" in lieu of actual 
mitigation should not be tolerated, sanctioned or condoned by any single branch of Idaho State 
govemment.4 
D. HE DIRECTOR'S DENIAL SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE THE 
APPLICATION DOES NOT PROPOSE TO APPLY TO \VATER TO ANY 
DEFINED BENEFICIAL USE. 
The hearing officer approved this Application with a beneficial use described simply as 
"mitigation." Mitigation does not adequately describe a beneficial use. Mitigation is a motivation. 
The word mitigation describes a beneficial use in the same way that "making money" or 
4 The District Court indicated that the Director will have the opportunity to consider the issue of mitigation when a 
mitigation plan is filed to obtain mitigation credit related to the GWDs' Application. (R., p. 199 fin 8). Having 
ruled that there is no such mitigation, the Director should deny any such mitigation plan. However, the fact that 
further proceedings on this issue may occur should not limit the Director's discretion to deny the Application. It 
merely highlights the lack of any beneficial use. 
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"improving aesthetics" could be used to describe an irrigation water right Mitigation describes 
why a water right is being sought, but does not provide any insight into how the water is being 
used. To the extent that "mitigation" is allowed to be used as a description for a beneficial use, it 
must be defined. If not, the Department has no way to evaluate or administer the proposed water 
right as illustrated by this case. There must also be an evaluation as to whether there is any 
beneficial use actually occurring. 
If, the beneficiai use of a water right is described as "mitigation" there must be some 
evaluation of what that means. Although the Director ultimately rejected the GWDs' Application 
because it was made in bad faith and was not in the local public interest, he determined that 
"mitigation" can be the stated beneficial use of water. This was erroneous. 
The Director purported to define the tenn "mitigation" based upon the definition of 
"mitigation plan" found in the Conjunctive Management Rules. The problem in this case is that 
he allowed "mitigation" as a stated beneficial use even though he specifically found that the 
GWDs' proposed use was just a "mitigation shell game" that provides no real benefit to Rangen 
or any other Billingsley Creek water user. The District Court saw no relevance in whether the 
proposed beneficial use actually provided mitigation, yet acknowledged this could be a factor to 
be considered in whether to approve a mitigation plan.5 (See R., p. 199 fin 8). The District Court's 
reasoning is flawed - if the proposed beneficial use is "mitigation" then whether the water right 
5 It is certainly true that no mitigation plan could be approved based upon this water right because there is no benefit 
to Rangen from this water right. This fact should be fatal to both a mitigation plan and to any application seeking a 
water right for mitigation. Yet, the District Court seems to be saying that the Director has no authority when 
reviewing a water right proposed for "mitigation" to determine whether or not the proposed use actually mitigates. 
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actually is going to provide mitigation is a relevant inquiry and is not an issue the Director should 
wait to decide until the mitigation plan hearing. 
One of the most fundamental principles of Idaho water law is that water must be put to a 
beneficial use, and that a water right is not obtained unless there is a diversion and application of 
water to a beneficial use. The Idaho Supreme Court in United States v. Pioneer Irrigation Water 
District, 144 Idaho 106, 113, 157 P.3d 600 (2007), stated: 
A common theme throughout [Idaho water iaw] is the recognition of the connection 
between beneficial use of water and ownership rights. The underlying principle of 
the state law, which requires application of the water to beneficial use before a 
water right is perfected, is the same. In Idaho the appropriator must apply the water 
to a beneficial use in order to have a valid water right under both the constitutional 
method of appropriation and statutory method of appropriation. Basinger, 36 Idaho 
at 598, 211 P. at 1086-87; LC. §§ 42-217 & 42-219. The requirement 
of beneficial use is repeatedly referred to throughout the Idaho Code. 
* * * 
Further, LC. § 42-104 states, "The appropriation must be for some useful or 
beneficial purpose, and when the appropriator or his successor in interest ceases to 
use it for such purpose, the right ceases." Idaho Code § 42-201 (1) provides in part: 
"All rights to divert and use the waters of this state for beneficial purposes shall 
hereafter be acquired and confirmed under the provisions of this chapter and not 
otherwise .... Such appropriation shall be perfected only by means of the application, 
permit and license procedure as provided in this title." As previously noted, in order 
to obtain a licensed water right in Idaho one must prove that the water has been 
applied to a beneficial use. LC. § 42-217. The districts act on behalf of the 
landowners within the districts to put the water to beneficial use. It is 
that beneficial use that determines water right ownership. 
Id. at 144 Idaho 113. 
Under all well-established rules of appropriation, the mere observation that water may be 
unappropriated can never constitute a "beneficial use" of water. Idaho water law always speaks 
in terms of "delivery and use" of water. Without both delivery and use of water, a beneficial use 
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never occurs. Id.; IDAHO CONS., Art. XV, Section 3; Nielsen v. Parker, 19 Idaho 727, 115 P. 
488(1911); Furey v. Taylor, 22 Idaho 605, 127 P. 676 (1912); Cant/in v. Carter, 85 Idaho 179, 397 
P.2d 761 (1964). 
As this case illustrates, the failure to identify an actual use makes it impossible to evaluate 
an application for a permit under the I.C. § 42-203A(5) factors. In order to evaluate the 
Application, more information is necessary. For instance, there is no way to tell from a description 
of "mitigation" whether the use of the water wiil be consumptive. Similariy, there is no way to 
tell when and if a water right application has been perfected without knowing how it will be used. 
The additional information that is needed is how the right would actually be used. 
In order to evaluate the GWDs' Application, another use, "fish propagation," had to be 
assumed with, and added to, the "mitigation" use. The entire evaluation by the GWDs' experts 
assumed the "mitigation" use was, in fact, for "fish propagation." Scott King, the GWDs' expert, 
admitted this fact: 
Q. Okay. Is it your opinion, then, all's they have to do is obtain unappropriated 
water under a permit and do nothing else and it's perfected? 
A. No. 
Q. Then how is this water right perfected 
A. The water right's perfected by using it for beneficial use within the facility. 
Q. Okay. And you understand -- that's clear that's your testimony, that's how 
this water right gets perfected? 
A. That's my understanding of how this water right would be perfected, yes. 
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Q. All right So someone's got to file a proof of beneficial use that says the 
water right is in fact used within the facility for a beneficial purpose, which I 
take it, fish propagation? 
A. Correct. 
(A.R., Tr. p. 233-34). 
The hearing officer's analysis of this Application illustrates the potential absurdity of 
allowing the beneficial use of a water right to be described as simply "mitigation." The GWDs' 
Application stated proposed beneficial uses of "fish propagation" and "mitigation." The hearing 
officer analyzed both of these beneficial uses utilizing the factors set forth in LC.§ 42-203A. The 
Hearing Officer's analyses for both "mitigation" and "fish propagation" assumed that the water 
would actually be used for fish propagation in Rangen's facility. Yet, despite the fact that the 
manner in which the water would be used was identical, the hearing officer granted the water right 
for "mitigation," but denied the water right for "fish propagation." (R., p. 276.) The Director's 
Final Order in this case would have allowed this absurd result to stand in the absence of his finding 
with regard to bad faith and the local public interest. 
E. THE DIRECTOR'S DENIAL SHOULD BE AFFIRMED ON THE 
ADDITIONAL BASIS THAT THE DISTRICTS' APPLICATION IS 
INCOMPLETE. 
The Districts' Application should not have been accepted because it was incomplete. The 
District Court did not address any of Rangen's substantive arguments on this point. Rather, the 
court merely stated that the agency exercised its discretion and that there was "ample evidence in 
the record supporting the Director's decision in this respect." (R., p. 200). The Application was 
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not complete because there was no evidence that the Application was executed properly. ID APA 
37.03.08.035.01 d provides that all applications for a water right: 
shall include all necessary infonnation as described in Rule Subsection 035.03. An 
application for permit that is not complete as described in Rule Subsection 035.03 
will not be accepted for filing and will be returned along with any fees submitted 
to the person submitting the application. No priority will be established by an 
incomplete application. 
IDAPA 37.03.08.035.01.d (Emphasis added). Along with being returned, an incomplete 
application is not entitled to a priority date. A priority date is only established when an application 
"is received in complete form." IDAPA 37.03.08.035.02.b.; Lemmon v. Hardy, supra, at p. 781. 
One of the requirements for a complete application is a duly authorized signature on the 
Application. In pertinent part, IDAPA 37.03.08.035.03.b requires: 
i. The name and post office address of the applicant shall be listed. If the 
application is in the name of a corporation, the names and addresses of its directors 
and officers shall be provided. If the application is filed by or on behalf of a 
partnership or joint venture, the application shall provide the names and addresses 
of all partners and shall designate the managing partner, if any. 
* * * 
xii. The application form shall be signed by the applicant listed on the 
application or evidence must be submitted to show that the signatory has 
authority to sign the application. An application in more than one (1) name shall 
be signed by each applicant unless the names are joined by "or" or "and/or." 
xiii. Applications by corporations, companies or municipalities or other 
organizations shall be signed by an officer of the corporation or company or 
an elected official of the municipality or an individual authorized by the 
organization to sign the application. The signatory's title shall be shown with the 
signature. 
* * * 
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xiv. Applications may be signed by a person having a current "power of attorney" 
authorized by the applicant. A copy of the "power of attorney" shall be included 
with the application. 
IDAPA 37.03.08.035.03.b (Emphasis added). 
Here. the Ann1ication was si!lned hv "Thomas J Bud!le. Attornev." There is no indication 
! .l.l '-1 -' '-') .I 
from the face of the Application as to whom Mr. Budge represented. He does not indicate 
specifically which, if any, of the Districts he was signing for. Furthennore, none of the addresses 
of the Applicants are included. At the time of filing, there was no "evidence" of any authority. To 
date, no evidence of authority at the time of the filing of the Application has been submitted to the 
Department. 
During the hearing, the Districts admitted Corporate Resolutions for the North Snake and 
Magic Valley Ground Water Districts, but no Corporate Resolutions were admitted showing 
authority for the other five Ground Water Districts. The Resolutions were dated September, 2014 
- more than a year after the Application was submitted. (AR., Exh. 1076, 1077). Likewise, the 
Districts submitted Powers of Attorney for the Magic Valley and North Snake Ground Water 
Districts, but no Powers of Attorney were admitted from the other five Ground Water Districts. 
The Powers of attorney were dated in May, 2014 more than a year after the Application was 
submitted. (A.R., Exh. 1073, 1074). 
Because no authority has been filed for all the Applicant GWDs, the Application is not 
complete and no permit can be granted and no priority date can be established. Again, if an 
application is not complete, the application may not be accepted and must be returned to the 
applicant. Lemmon v. Hardy, supra, at p. 781; IDAPA 37.03.08.035.01.d and 03.b. If the 
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Department does not return the Application, the Applicants still cannot receive any priority date 
because the Application is not complete even at this late date. 
Evidence of Mr. Budge's authority to file the Application is not a mere formality. It is 
essential that agents working on behalf of their principals have express authority to act. This is 
particularly true with respect to public entities. In this case, Mr. Carlquist's testimony, on behalf 
of the North Snake Ground Water District, was anything but clear when it came to whether the 
Board of Directors ever authorized Mr. Budge to fiie the Application at issue prior to its filing. At 
best, Mr. Carlquist's testimony establishes that he had telephone "conferences" with fellow board 
members where they discussed filing the application and that they said yes to get the Application 
filed. (A.R., Tr., p. 61, ll. 14-23). Mr. Carlquist admitted that a meeting of the Board was never 
convened to consider the filing of the Application. (Id). 
A Ground Water District can only act through its Board of Directors. One of the specific 
powers of the Board of Directors is to "appropriate ... water within the state." LC. § 42-5224(8). 
The Board of Directors can only act through regular monthly meetings or special meetings. See 
I.C. § 42-5223(3). The Board has to give 72-hour advance notice of special meetings and all 
meetings are public. Id. Public agencies, like the GWDs, cannot make decisions during private 
telephone calls with each other. Public agencies can only make decisions in public during regularly 
convened monthly meetings or special meetings after proper notice and publication of an agenda. 
"If an action, or any deliberation or decision making that leads to an action, occurs at any meeting 
which fails to comply with [Idaho's Open Meeting Law] such action shall be null and void." LC. 
§ 67-2347. 
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Instead of following all the procedures, the Department essentially excused the GWDs' 
lack of compliance on the basis that the Application was accepted by the Department when it was 
filed. The fact that the Department accepted the Application is not dispositive as to whether the 
Application was complete when it was filed. For these reasons, the Director's conclusion that the 
Application was complete should be reversed. 
F. RAN GEN'S SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS HA VE BEEN PREJUDICED BY 
THE REVERSAL OF THE DIRECTOR'S DECISION. 
Rangen's substantial rights are prejudiced by the reversal of the Director's ruling on the 
GWDs' talus slope Application. There is no dispute that junior-priority groundwater pumping in 
the ESPA is causing material injury to Rangen's senior water rights. Junior-priority users have 
been ordered to deliver 9.1 cfs of mitigation water phased in over a five-year period or face 
curtailment. The GWDs seek to satisfy that obligation merely by delivering Rangen an 
Application for Permit that does not add any new water to Billingsley Creek or the Martin-Curren 
Tunnel and allows the damage to the Eastern Snake Plain aquifer to continue. Director Spackman 
called the GWDs' plan "the epitome of a mitigation shell game." If the Application is approved, 
Rangen will be in the exact same position as before it filed its Delivery Call, injured and impacted 
without any meaningful mitigation. This results in Rangen's substantial rights being affected by 
the outcome of this case. 6 
6 Even the District Court acknowledged that if Rangen is not being provided any "new water to the already 
diminished flows of the Current [sic] Tunnel or headwaters of Billingsley Creek," the fact that no new water is being 
provided to the depleted source may be relevant "in any proceeding seeking approval of any mitigation plan which 
the appropriation is intended." (R., p. 199 fin 8). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
For all these reasons, the Director's decision to deny the GWDs' pennit should be affirmed. 
DATED this 12th day of January, 2016. 
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